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Abstract
This paper surveys evidence on fiscal multipliers from the Euro area and the
United States obtained by direct, cross-state or economywide measures of the effects
of broad-based tax cuts and increases in government purchases. In view of the evi-
dence in the literature I conclude that that fiscal policy may be substantially more
effective when the proportion of households and firms that are liquidity constrained
is high and when utilization of factors of production is low.
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1 Introduction
The fiscal policy response to the recession of 2007-2009 has been significant in an histori-
cal perspective. Virtually all OECD countries have carried out discretionary measures in
response to the crisis.1 With considerable cross-country variation in the scale and compo-
∗I am grateful to Michael Burda for helpful discussions and comments. This research was supported
by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through the CRC 649 "Economic Risk".
¶Ifo Institute, Poschinger Str. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany, E-mail: hristov.a@ifo.de.
1Discretionary or activist fiscal policy means government expenditure and/or tax policy that is
changed, typically through legislation, without any anticipated reason. This is distinct from discre-
tionary systematic and automatic policy, by which expenditures and taxation change either as a result
of changes in economic activity and/or without any involvement on the part of the policy-makers.
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sition of the undertaked crisis measures, the stimulus program introduced by the average
OECD country had a cumulated budget impact over the period 2008-10 totaling up to
more than 2.5 percent of 2008 GDP. The United States had the largest fiscal package of
around 5.5 percent of 2008 GDP.2
Despite the recent widespread use of fiscal policy, controversy still remains about
when and how to use fiscal policy as a stabilization instrument. Often both empirical
estimates and theoretical predictions on discretionary fiscal expansions are ambiguous
not only about the magnitude of responses of macroeconomic aggregates but also on the
direction of those responses. In this work, I review multiplier estimates from the Euro area
and the United States on common types of fiscal policy initiatives: mainly, broad-based
tax cuts and unproductive spending increases.3 The multiplier is broadly the increase in
the number of currency units in total national output and income (or respectively, the
increase in the number of currency units in a component of aggregate demand other than
government spending) per currency unit of either a stimulus spending increase or of a
particular taxation cut.4 The exposition of the review is centered around the different
methods that have been employed in estimating/simulating the fiscal multipliers; i.e.
direct, cross-state or economywide measures.5,6 I discuss each of these methods and their
estimates of the various multipliers.
2See Table 3.1., chapter 3 in OECD (2009).
3Broadly, spending is unproductive if it does not affect the private sector production functions. In
contrast, spending on public infrastructure improves private productivity for many years to come.
4The fascination with the size of the multiplier is related to the predictive power of this simple
metric regarding how fast the economy may grow following fiscal stimulus actions and whether some
form of direct crowding-out may be taking place. Leaving aside normative analysis considerations, the
general assumption is that the larger is the multiplier, the more beneficial is the discretionary stimulus.
Multipliers as a metric are not very eloquent on the consequences for overall welfare. That is, whether
output increases caused by activist fiscal policy are desirable or not needs to be evaluated by other means.
5There are already several recent surveys on activist fiscal policy. Auerbach et al. (2010) evaluate
the impact of the legislated in 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) on the United
States output and budget. The paper surveys evidence on the effects of fiscal policy on economic activity
by all main approaches in the literature. Similarly, Spilimbergo et al. (2009) and Ramey (2011b) survey
the literature, however, the focus is placed mainly on economywide fiscal multipliers, and not on direct
micro-based ones. Hebous (2011) contains a detailed review of multipliers and responses of components
of aggregate demand following fiscal shocks in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models and vector
auto-regressions. Parker (2011) highlighted the methodological difficulties with measuring the efficacy of
fiscal policy.
6Discussing fiscal policy involves many important aspects that are left beyond the scope of this survey.
Examples are the productive use of government spending related to public investment (Baxter and King,
1993), or public employment (Finn, 1998), the sustainability of fiscal policy (Uctum and Wickens, 2000),
the intergenerational aspect of the public debt burden (Auerbach, 2009a), and the role of automatic
stabilizers (Auerbach and Feenberg, 2000).
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Comparing the estimates of the multipliers—obtained through the use of the different
methods—provides a natural way of finding the consensus size of the fiscal effects. The
exercise is important not only because it allows narrowing the range of the "true" multi-
pliers, but also because it uncovers the drawbacks of the methods, and their underlying
identifying assumptions. For example, finding a statistically significant partial-equilibrium
effect at the micro level foreshadows the existence of the effect at the macro level. Missing
to detect the effect at the macro level, however, signals the possibilty that either the effect
is undercut by counteracting reactions, or that, when obtaining the macro estimate, we
have failed to account for important determining factors. In view of the difficulties that
both empiricist and theorist have to confront when answering the question "how effec-
tive is fiscal policy", examining the estimates from the different methods could be highly
informative of which factors deserve a special attention.
Consider first the empiricist’s perspective. First, fiscal policy has a variety of instru-
ments available at its disposal.7 And, each of the these instruments has different effects
on the private sector and aggregate outcomes. Thus, measuring the efficacy of a stim-
ulus package is dependent on properly accounting for its composition and the dynamic
effects of each of its instruments. Second, policy actions and economic activity are both
endogenous—in that, they affect each other simultaneously—and, thus, identifying clearly
the causal link between the two is prone to mistake and bias. Third, fiscal policy changes
have different effects at the time of announcement and the time of implementation, and
every assessment of the policy effects has to account for these nuances. Moreover, policy
assessment must take into consideration the economic conditions under which fiscal ac-
tions were taken. The theorist has to cope with other difficulties. Above all, there are
important concerns regarding the degree of misspecification of current theoretical models.
Given how stylized these models are, it is still a question whether they will truly be able
to describe in a useful fashion the dynamics of the data.
7Fiscal expansions may be carried out by cutting net taxes (taxes minus transfer payments) or in-
creasing government spending. Government spending may be divided into government investment and
government consumption (purchases of goods and services for current use), where the latter is the sum of
wage and non-wage consumption. The government levies both lump sum and distortionary taxes. The
former is a tax on households or firms which is collected independently from the actions of the agents.
For that reason, this tax has the desirable property that it does not have an effect on the choices of the
agents. Lump-sum taxes, however, are typically not used by the government. Among the distortionary
taxes with which the government raises most of its revenues include labor, corporate and value-added
taxes.
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In a recent study Ramey (2011b) concluded that the size of the multiplier following a
temporary, deficit-financed rise in government purchases lies between 0.8 and 1.5. Around
the same time, Parker (2011) emphasized that the efficacy of fiscal policy is conditional
ultimately on the state of the economy. Inspecting the values of the multipliers of all the
different measures in the literature, I conclude that that fiscal policy may be substantially
more effective when the proportion of households and firms that are liquidity constrained
is high and when utilization of factors of production is low; namely, fiscal multipliers are
higher in a recession. Thus, the conditional effect, for example, of an unanticipated rise
in government purchases in a recession may likely be higher than 1.5, the plausible upper
bound suggested by Ramey (2011b).
The discussion continues as follows. In Section 2, I list some of the most important
sets of reasons that have been advanced as pros and cons for the use of fiscal policy in
aggregate demand stabilization. Then, in Section 3 I review briefly different definitions
of fiscal multipliers and ways to obtain them. I continue by discussing separately the
evidence obtained by the different methods. Finally, I conclude.
2 Reasons against and for the use of fiscal stimulus
The impetus for boosting economic activity through fiscal stimulus has not always been
so strong as at the beginning of the Great Recession. From the narrative account in
Blinder (2004), the progression of economic thinking on the efficacy of fiscal policy as
a device for macroeconomic management and the impetus for activist fiscal actions has
moved up and down over the years. The history of thought on fiscal policy started
presumably with the rise of popularity of the General Theory by Keynes (1936). Beliefs
in the efficacy of discretionary fiscal policy may have reached a relative peak during the
sixties or early seventies. Then, a series of events cast doubts on the effectiveness of
fiscal policy. In one of them, to counteract the adverse oil shocks of the seventies many
governments reached towards expansionary monetary and fiscal policy. Active policies,
however, did not prevent the widespread rise in unemployment but, unfortunately, left a
dent in the public budgets from the resulting high deficits. As a consequence, at least
until the last years, the common view among many economists was that countercyclical
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discretionary fiscal policy was undesirable and/or inefficient (e.g., Eichenbaum, 1997; and
Taylor, 2000).8 Only recently, this perception on fiscal policy has shifted—not the least
because of the accumulation of new evidence prompted by the renewed interest in the
effects of fiscal policy—and may have begun to converge upon a more moderate point of
view. For example for the United States, Auerbach and Gale (2009) uncover increased
sensitivity of the fiscal policy reactions functions, those of legislated government spending
and taxation, to the phase of the business cycle and the public budget in the years
after the first inauguration of George W. Bush as president relative to the sensitivity
during previous administrations. It appears that many economists and policy-makers
may have begun to perceive countercyclical fiscal policy as a potential and timely tool for
counteracting the perils of economic downturns.
Following the painful experience of high unemployment in the 1970s that was further
aggravated by high inflation, the economic profession offered several widely accepted ar-
guements against the use of discretionary fiscal policy. These arguements can be further
classified into two groups. That is, activist fiscal policy is undesirable because it is dom-
inated by monetary policy in stabilizing aggregate outcomes and it is in fact inefficient.
Below, I review some of those most emphasized groups of con reasons.
First, fiscal policy is subject to potentially long inside lags, which comprise the de-
lays between recognition of the need for stimulus initiatives and the implementation of
the relevant policies. Some inside lags occur for inevitable and necessary administrative
reasons (e.g. some project are easier to get started than others), other for political rea-
sons (legislation process in parliament on whether and how to change taxes or spending
is slow). Taken the average recession lasts about a year from peak to trough, using a
legislated stimulus program at just the right time could at best be a lucky coincidence
or at worst be potentially destabilising—a point well emphasized by Friedman (1953).
Friedman believed that the economic system is eventually self-equilibrating. In addition,
he stressed that timely knowledge about the economy, combined with the uncertainty
surrounding the impact of policy measures, is insufficient for properly adressing short-run
out-of-equilibrium events.
Second, fiscal policy’s efforts to stabilize aggregate demand can be offset by the ex-
8Blinder (2004) and Blanchard (2006) have expressed more cautious views.
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pectations and actions of rational households and firms who anticipate the future policy
motives—an implication of the Lucas (1976) critique. For example, one reason why in-
vestment might drop following the legislation of a stimulus program is the expectation
that a distortionary investment incentive will be enacted soon after the program expires.
An extension of this line of reasoning can lead one to question whether fiscal policy may
influence macroeconomic outcomes at all. For example, changes in the pattern of taxation
and public spending which leave the life-time private wealth unaffected need not have an
effect on private spending. The argument is known as the "Ricardian equivalence" (Barro,
1974).9 In case the Ricardian proposition holds true in reality, economists stress that the
marginal propensity to spend—a central determinant of the efficacy of fiscal policy—out
of temporary tax cuts is likely to be zero.
Third, fiscal policy may have "non-Keynesian" effects, summarized recently by Gi-
avazzi et al. (2000). That is, contractionary fiscal policy, by successfully consolidating the
public budget, may have even an expansionary (stimulating) impact on the economy. This
can occur by lowering long-term interest rates, as bond investors react to the decreased
risks to fiscal sustainability driven by the drop in public debt and future fiscal obligations.
Last but not least, fiscal policy, to a greater extent than monetary policy, is more
prone to be influenced by political constraints. That is, monetary policy is delegated in
the hands of independent experts.
Monetary policy, mostly because of its shorter inside lags and because of the likely
long-run economic harm poorly-crafted fiscal stimulus packages can incur—by leaving
the economy, for example, with a permanently larger public debt—is generally favored
as the policy of choice when it comes to fighting an economic slowdown. In addition,
monetary policy is less prone to political pressures. Recently, however, Blinder (2004),
Blanchard (2006) and Allsopp and Vines (2005) have reevaluated both the undesirability
and inefficiency conditions for the use of activist fiscal policy, and the priority role of
monetary policy as a stabilization instrument. Throughout and after the Great Recesion,
the list of economists who have argued that monetary policy and the automatic fiscal
9Ricardian equivalence holds only if taxes are not distortionary. There are also a number of other
explicit or implicit assumptions upon which the Ricardian proposition depends, among them: bequests,
successive generations are linked by altruistically motivated transfers; capital markets are either perfect,
or are distorted in specific ways; consumers are rational; the pattern of taxation does not redistribute
resources within generations. Bernheim (1987) contains a survey and a synthesis of the work on Ricardian
equivalance stimulated by Robert Barro.
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stabilizers alone could be an insufficient counter-weight against strong adverse shocks—
like the one that caused the Great Recession—has enlarged. Below, I examine some of
the pro conditions under which fiscal stimulus is appropriate and effective.
First, most evidence suggest that fiscal policy’s outside lags—the period between a
fiscal policy shock and its ramifications on the economy—are significantly shorter than
the respective outside lags of monetary policy actions.10 This implies that fiscal stimulus
can stimulate economic activity more quickly, once implemented, than monetary policy.
Second, one must acknowledge the possibility that the private sector may deviate
from the kind of rational long-term planning envisioned by the life-cycle (Modigliani
and Brumberg, 1954; 1980) or by the permanent income models (Friedman, 1957).11 For
example, if households are sufficiently shortsighted or, if a large number of them are credit-
constrained, then temporary fluctuations in disposable income caused by the government
may have substantial effects on aggregate spending.
Third, economic analysis of monetary and fiscal policy, and their interaction, show
broadly that the enactment of the two instruments with the same goal dominates outcomes
compared to using only one instrument. Blanchard et al. (2010) emphasize that relying
primarily on monetary policy as a stabilisational tool is too restrictive. Macroeconomic
policy must have many targets—more than inflation and output gap stabilisation—and,
to achieve them, it need to resort to any of the wide array of instruments at its disposal—
from "unconventional" monetary policy to fiscal instruments, to regulatory instruments.
The argument goes back at least to the analysis of Brainard (1967) who finds that if
the effects of policy instruments are uncertain policy-makers may better use every tool
available. The rationale is that the effects of the different instruments can cancel out at
least partially. However, if fiscal and monetary policy are employed together to achieve
the same goal, this can reduce the uncertainty about whether the provided amount of
stimulus is sufficient.
Fourth, fiscal stimulus could be critically important if the zero lower bound on nominal
interest rates is reached; a relevant issue in the current macroeconomy (e.g., Hall, 2011;
Christiano et al., 2011; and Woodford, 2011). In this case, as shown in Rudebusch (2009),
10See, e.g., Blinder (2004) and Elmendorf and Furman (2008) who report evidence from the Federal
Reserve’s quantitative models of the U.S. economy.
11Attanasio and Weber (2010) survey the recent literature on the life cycle model of consumption.
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the desired easing—according to an estimated Taylor rule—of the monetary policy funds
rates could be highly insufficient in view of the increase of the unemployment rate and the
fall of the inflation rate. Monetary policy, though not completely powerless, is strongly
constrained. In addition, in such an environment fiscal stimulus could be greatly efficient
(Eggertsson and Woodford, 2006).
Based on the above considerations, several economists have suggested that the evalua-
tion and design of activist fiscal policy have to be based on three principles (see Summers,
2007; and Elmendorf and Furman, 2008, among others). The principles state that discre-
tionary fiscal policies should be timely, targeted, and temporary.12 Timely: Policy actions
should be taken in a timely fashion in times of economic slowdown. Targeted: From a
macroeconomic perspective, policy-makers should ensure that first, stimulus is directed
towards the ones in greatest need, and second, aggregate output and income increases the
most for each currency unit spent or, respectively, for a particular tax rate decreased by
a similar magnitude. Temporary: Policy actions should not increase the budget deficit in
the long-run. That is, fiscal sustainability should not be put at risk.
3 Fiscal multipliers: setting the stage
The majority of the studies that measure or simulate the effect of exogenous changes in
government purchases or tax revenues report the impact output multiplier defined as
Impact multiplier(k) =
∆Yt+k
∆Ft
.
The measure reports the increase in the level of output Y at k periods following the change
in F at time t. Thus, ∆F denotes either the increase in government purchases or the fall
in tax revenues.
Following Mountford and Uhlig (2009), many studies have started to report increas-
ingly the cumulated (present-value) multiplier. This multiplier has an advantage over the
impact multipliers because of the additional information it incorporates regarding both
the persistence of the exogenous fiscal event and the relative weight of the macroeconomic
12Blanchard et al. (2009) argue that discretionary policy should accomplish seven objectives: "timely,
large, lasting, diversified, contingent, collective, and sustainable", principles that are too multi-faceted to
be useful in terms of guidelines for execution.
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outcomes in the future. The cumulated multiplier is calculated as the sum of discounted
values of additional output over k periods that is the result of the present-value change
in government purchases or revenues,
Cumulated multiplier(k) =
∑k
j=0
∏j
i=0(1 + rt+i)
−j∆Yt+k∑k
j=0
∏j
i=0(1 + rt+i)
−j∆Ft+k
.
Both of these two definitions of the multiplier provide valuable information on the
efficacy of fiscal policy, and none of them is superior to the other. For example, from
the impact multiplier we can find out when the effect of the policy initiative reaches its
peak—an information that is valuable to assess the outside lag of the fiscal instrument.
In my survey, I try to report, if available, both the impact multiplier at first quarter and
two years as well as the cumulated multiplier at two or three years.
Fiscal policy actions have a widespread effect on the decisions and behaviour of in-
dividual households, businesses, regions within a country and the whole economy. The
effects of these actions can broadly be divided into direct (microeconomic), cross-state
and economywide (macroeconomic). Relying on this classification, one can organize the
methodologies used to measure fiscal multipliers into:
• Direct effects: micro econometric studies of consumer and investment behavior in
response to fiscal shocks
• Cross-state effects
• Economywide effects:
- Large-scale macroeconomic models
- Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models (DSGE)
- Dynamic simulations and vector auto-regressions (VARs)
Microeconomic studies estimate only the direct, first-round effects, without considering
effects funneled through other indirect channels. In these papers, the focus is primarily
on the effects of policy changes on individual consumption and private investment. Cross-
state analysis measure the impact of differences in the variations of government purchases
and transfers on the regional economies. Macroeconomic studies estimate the overall
economywide multipliers, including dynamic second-round effects.
Although the literature is interested primarily in the output multipliers, both the direct
9
partial-equilibrium and the economywide general-equilibrium responses of consumption,
investment, wages, and employment following fiscal interventions are of independent in-
terest. Thus, when necessary, I discuss the responses of the other variables as well, as this
additional evidence can help us discern the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy. For
example, direct measures of the causal policy effects can ascertain the relevance of the
channels integral for the tranmission of the policy initiatives in the general-equilibrium
models.13 In addition, direct estimates that document the dependence of the policy effects
on the state of the various households and businesses can provide valuable information
about the dependence of the effects of the different policy initiatives on the state of econ-
omy, emphasized boldly by Parker (2011). Last but not least, variation at the micro and
regional level provide a rich source of information for obtaining multipliers on the fiscal
policy instruments. Indeed, the advantage of the micro and cross-state analysis (over
macro estimates) is the possibility to be very explicit about the origin of variation needed
for the econometric identification.
Existing estimates of the multipliers, especially from the economywide studies, tend
to vary greatly. Thus, it seems natural to accept not only that the methodologies to
measure the multipliers have weaknesses and caveats but also that there is no unique
"multiplier". As a result, any estimate of a multiplier should be tagged with information
about the assumptions under which it is valid, under what state of the economy it has been
obtained and what type of fiscal stimuli is considered. This has been emphasized recently
by Solow (2011). In a similar vein, Ilzetzki et al. (2011) have demonstrated convincingly
that the country of interest and characteristics of the economy are important determinants
of the multiplier. The authors show that larger fiscal multipliers result from more closed
economies, higher income per capita countries, lower public debt, and fixed compared to
flexible exchange rate regimes.
Below I provide an overview of the methods employed in measuring the fiscal multi-
pliers, followed by a summary of the estimates.
13There are many channels through which fiscal policy affects aggregate outcomes. I discuss some of
them explicitly in Section 6.2. The behavior of real wage following a shock to temporary deficit-financed
government purchases is an example of how a response of a variable can verify the importance of channel.
A fall of the real wage is associated with the significance of the neoclasical channels, while a rise gives
evidence to the importance of the New Keynesian channels.
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4 Fiscal multipliers: direct effects
Tax cuts to stimulate investment and especially consumption have a long history. These
policy initiatives have been analyzed in a substantial literature, reviewed in greater detail
in Auerbach (2009b).14
4.1 Evidence from household responses to tax cuts
Because private consumption is the biggest component of GDP—amounting to more than
60 percent of output in the total OECD economy for the period 1970 to 2011—a sensible
argument has government boost consumption demand when stabilising the economy. That
is, the consumption response to policy changes is central to the transmission mechanism
of fiscal stimulus.
The empirical evidence, mostly from cross-sectional and less from time series data,
offer several fairly undesputed results about the marginal propensity to consume (MPC)
out of tax changes. Some of the main reasons why the studies use mainly cross-sectional
data are: first, time series data offer few observations on temporary taxes to provide
precise estimates; and second, at the micro level one can investigate heterogeneity and
nonlinearities in households’ responses. Overall, the direct estimates of the effects of tax
cuts vary less compared to those of other fiscal instruments and to those obtained by
other estimation methods.
The results are the following. First, in agreement with standard life-cycle and permanent-
income models, most of the evidence indicate that explicitly temporary changes in income
have smaller impact on household consumption than permanent changes.15 In Table 1,
I report evidence on the direct effects of tax cuts. Estimates of the effects of temporary
personal income tax cuts or rebates on private consumption vary from zero (Taylor, 2009)
to 0.1 (Feldstein, 2009), 0.2 (Blinder, 1981; and Broda and Parker, 2008), 0.33 (Shapiro
14The section is to a great extent a summary of the evidence on direct fiscal effects surveyed in Auerbach
et al. (2010).
15Okun (1971) has been the first to test empirically the plausibility of the permanent income hypoth-
esis (PIH). In the literature he initiated the PIH was tested by asking whether consumer responses to
temporary income changes are larger than suggested by the theoretical models. In the newer line of re-
search, sparked by Hall (1978), Robert Hall derived testable implications of the life-cycle model by using
the first-order conditions of the intertemporal optimization problem faced by the households, a method
known as the Euler equation approach. As a result, Hall reformulated the question slightly by asking
whether consumer responses to easily-predictable income changes are greater than suggested by theory.
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and Slemrod, 2003b) and even 0.4 (Johnson et al., 2006). Estimates of the effects of
longer-term or permanent tax cuts on private consumption vary between 0.55 (Blinder,
1981), 0.66 (Johnson et al., 2006), 0.7 (Feldstein, 2009) and 0.9 (Souleles, 1999).
Table 1: Studies of direct effects
Study Sample; Country Estimation/Identification Implied consumption
multiplier
Blinder (1981) Quarterly:
1953:Q1-1977:Q4;
U.S. data
Study of 1975 income tax rebate and 1968
surtax; Distributed lag estimation of a
consumption equation
At first quarter: 0.16;
Cumulative seven
quarters: 0.55
Broda and
Parker (2008)
Weekly: 2008:W1-
2008:W24; U.S.
data
Fixed-effect panel case study of the 2008 tax
rebate
First month after
receipt: 0.19
Feldstein (2009) Monthly:
1980:M1-
2008:M11; U.S.
data
Single consumer expenditure equation,
aggregate data
At first month: 0.13;
Marginal propensity
to spend: <0.70
Johnson et al.
(2006)
Surveys 2000 to
2002; U.S. data
Consumer expenditure survey data to study
the effect of the 2001 tax rebate
At first quarter:
0.20-0.40; Cumulative:
0.66-0.69
Parker et al.
(2011)
Surveys 2007 to
2009; U.S. data
Consumer expenditure survey data to study
the effect of the 2008 tax rebate
At first quarter:
0.12-0.35
Poterba (1988) Monthly:
1959:M6-1987:M9;
U.S. data
Study of 1975 income tax rebate and 1968
surtax with aggregate data; Single consumer
expenditure equation
At first month:
<0.12-0.24
Shapiro and
Slemrod
(2003b)
Surveys 2001 to
2002; U.S. data
Phone survey evidence on the propensity of
consumers to spend of 2001 rebate
At first quarter:
0.34-0.37
Souleles (1999) Surveys 1982 to
1983; U.S. data
Consumer expenditure survey data to study
the effect of the Reagan tax cuts
Marginal propensity
to spend: 0.66-0.87
Taylor (2009) Monthly:
2000:M1-
2008:M10; U.S.
data
Single consumer expenditure equation,
aggregate data
At first quarter: <0.01
Second, tax cuts may have different effect on the consumption behaviour dependent
on the state of an individual household. Recent studies that have estimated the effects of
predictable tax changes (such as tax rebates) on consumption find commonly that the es-
timates are heterogeneous among different income households, and bigger than zero (e.g.,
Shapiro and Slemrod, 2003a; Johnson et al., 2006; Agarwal et al., 2007; and Bertrand
and Morse, 2009). According to the life-cycle model, predictable policy actions should
not have an effect on spending decisions. As a result, to account for the discrepancy be-
tween theoretical and observed behavior, researchers frequently call upon the presence of
liquidity constraints.16 Liquidity constraints have important implications for the relation
between consumption and (expected) disposable income. Binding liquidity constraints
16For example, Hall (1978), Hayashi (1985), and Campbell and Mankiw (1989) have suggested that the
excess sensitivity of consumption to disposable income might be attributable to either a proportion of
the population behaving in a Keynesian "rule-of-thumb" way, spending a fixed ratio of their disposable
income, or to binding liquidity constraints.
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may induce excess sensitivity in consumption if constrained households experience tem-
porary changes in income: namely, consumption will fluctuate by more than suggested
by the intertemporal optimization problem. As predicted by the theory on liquidity con-
straints, the above cited papers find evidence that liquidity-constrained households tend
to have a larger MPC out of tax changes than do other households.
Third, while economic theory predicts that anticipated changes in taxes may affect
consumer behaviour ahead of their enactment, due to forward-looking nature of economic
decisions, spending reacts by relatively little to policy announcements. In contrast, most
of the changes in consumption tend to happen when the tax changes are implemented
(e.g., Poterba, 1988; Parker, 1999; Souleles, 1999; and Johnson et al., 2006, among others).
4.2 Evidence from firm responses to investment incentives
Gross private domestic investment is a smaller component of the GDP compared to con-
sumption (in the United States close to 20 percent of output). It is, however, volatile and
sensitive to expectations about future macroeconomic outcomes. The first characteristic
makes investment an attractive target for stabilization policy, while the second introduces
a difficulty with achieving the stabilization objective.
Estimating investment responses to changes in investment incentives, similar to esti-
mating household consumption responses to temporary tax rebates, however, is a more
challenging task for at least two reasons. First, because policy experiments causing
changes in investment incentives have been scarce (at least in the United States). And
second, because identifying clearly the change in the investment tax incentives is difficult
due to reasons like the interrelationships among tax provisions. Several papers estimate
the effects of corporate income tax cuts on investment decisions relying on firm-level panel
data (e.g., Auerbach and Hassett, 1991; Cummins et al., 1994; and Hassett and Hubbard,
2002). These "natural experiments" focus on episodes when tax changes are compara-
tively sizable and explain nearly all of the fluctuations in the user cost of capital—the
minumum return of an investment project above which financing the investment is worth
undertaking. The studies find robust support that changes in the cost of capital affect the
composition of investment, with the elasticity of equipment investment with respect to
the user cost of capital varying between -0.5 and -1.0. Similarly, House and Shapiro (2008)
13
find that recent corporate tax changes—in the form of bonus depreciation allowances to
qualifying investment—have lead to a change in the composition of investment.
Despite the above evidence, the knowledge about the responsiveness of aggregate pri-
vate investment to investment incentives is scarce. For example, we know that for the
majority of private firms internal and external funds are not perfect substitutes. Thus, in
the absence of perfect capital markets, the availability of internal funds, which is strongly
correlated with firm cash flow and sales, may affect the speed with which firms acquire
the desired amount of capital (e.g., Abel and Blanchard, 1986; Gilchrist and Himmel-
berg, 1999; and Gilchrist and Zakrajsek, 2007). Yet, we still know very little about how
fiscal initiatives affect firms’ investment decisions when business losses are big (as in a
recession), liquidity constraints are tight and uncertainty is high (Bloom et al., 2007).
5 Fiscal multipliers: cross-state effects
Apart from influencing households’ and business decisions with tax cuts, fiscal policy can
affect the economy by varying the regional (state and local) spending and tax policy.
Regional fiscal policy is a powerful source for (de)stabilizing aggregate spending. Al-
though central governments allocate on average the biggest proportion out of the total
government resources, regional governments may still have huge power to shape policies
and programmes.17 In view of the fact that the majority of the sub-national government
entities are supposed to run a balanced budget, facing a negative shock—which causes a
drop in revenues—state and local governments may need to cut spending and raise taxes.
Either of these will likely worsen the recession. As a result, federal transfers to the re-
gional governments that are severely affected by the shock, sponsored by well-off regional
governments, may ease the necessity of running a procyclical fiscal policy in recessions.
Recent work have exploited variation at the regional level to measure the income or
employment effects of government spending using an instrumental variable approach. As
discussed in Section 3, the opportunity to be explicit about the source of variation, and
the richness of the data, provide an advantage of these "natural experiments" over time-
17In 2011, in the European Union (EU-27) total expenditires at the state and local government level was
equal to 16.7 % of GDP, while in the United States the respective ratio was 12.2 %. Source: Eurostat’s
gov_a_main tables and BEA’s National Income and Product Accounts tables.
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series methods in terms of better econometric identification. The studies make use of the
fact that sizeable components of the sub-national spending are provided by the federal
government on a basis unrelated to the economic conditions in the particular region.
For example, Nakamura and Steinsson (2011) observe that US military build-ups lead to
proportinally different allocation of federal resources across the states.
On the other hand, the application of such cross-section and panel methods does not
allow a direct comparison of the cross-state with the economywide estimates (see, e.g,
Clemens and Miran, 2012). Ideally, the natural experiment will measure unexpected
changes in government purchases (or transfers) that are deficit financed. In contrast, in
most cases the regional changes in spending are windfall financed. Thus, both the weak
regions, that receive the windfall, and the stronger ones, that do not, pay for the windfall
bill. This means that policies at the national level remain constant. That said, to the
extent that regional spending was accompanied by changes of the interest rates and taxes,
the windfall multipliers could be quite different to the multipliers that are reported in the
cross-state literature: they are most likely lower. In addition, regions within a country
are more interconnected with each other than neighbouring countries. As a result, the
sub-national spending is going to induce stronger leakages across regions compared to
leakages across coutries caused by aggregate fiscal policy.
Despite the different identifying strategies, most of these recent studies find significant
positive multipliers. The reported income multipliers on impact in Acconcia et al. (2011),
Chodorow-Reich et al. (2011), Feyrer and Sacerdote (2011), Serrato and Wingender (2011)
and Clemens and Miran (2012) vary broadly between 1.5 and 2.5. In addition, several
works find that the fiscal effects are significantly bigger in periods when the utilization
of resources is low (e.g. Shoag, 2011; Serrato and Wingender, 2011; and Nakamura and
Steinsson, 2011). With the caveat that the cross-state evidence is not directly comparable
to the economywide multiplier, the above result do suggest that redistributive policies
can have significant effects on aggregate income and employment. As discussed in Shoag
(2011) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2011), such estimates provide a direct measure of
the efficacy of fiscal policy carrying out regional risk-sharing. The evidence may be highly
informative for policy in the European Union, where the regions are the economies within
the currency union.
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6 Fiscal multipliers: economywide effects
6.1 Large-scale macroeconomic models
A number of large-scale macroeconomic models were developed during the 1950s and 1960s
- the Lawrence R. Klein and Arthur S. Goldberger’s model, the Data Research Institute
model, the Wharton model, and a variety of Federal Reserve models, among them.18 A
distinctive characteristic of these models—among which the Klein and Goldberger’s model
was the first of its kind—is that they were based on the then-reigning Keynesian IS-LM
framework. The models allowed for the possibility of non-clearing markets, contained both
behavioral equations—in particular those for aggregate consumption and investment—and
a number of important accounting identities—the GNP identity, balance sheet, flow-of-
funds constraints, among others. Apart from their rich structure and the possibility
of interactions between different markets, the models have had a very good empirical
performance. The second generation of these models in the 1990s improved over their
predecessors in regard to the treatment of expectations and intertemporal decisions, while
at the same time holding to a high standard the empirical goodness of fit.
Of all macro models, large-scale macro models often predict/estimate the largest out-
put multipliers. Looking at Table 2, the quarter or one year output multipliers for the
Unites States and the Euro area estimated from the second generation models in Dals-
gaard et al. (2001) and for the United States in Coenen et al. (2010) respectively are
about one or slightly above. In comparison, the first generation models in Evans (1969)
estimate even bigger multipliers at first quarter following government spending shocks,
1.20-2.10. It is worth noting that in Evans (1969) and in Coenen et al. (2010) the output
multipliers following spending shocks are slightly higher compared to multipliers following
taxation shocks at the different reported horizons.
Although it is difficult to explain intuitively the dynamics of these models, the basic
mechanism generating these large output multipliers is illustrated by the so-called "Key-
nesian Cross Diagram". The diagram maps a positive relationship between consumer
changes in demand that are driven by changes in disposable income, with the latter de-
pending positively on total national output. With constant interest rates, the government
18The macroeconometric literature is described in considerable detail in Bodkin et al. (1991).
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Table 2: Studies with large-scale macroeconomic models
Study Sample; Country Estimation/Identification Implied output
multiplier
Evans (1969) Quarterly:
1966:Q1-1975:Q4;
U.S. data
Estimation based on the Wharton-EFU
model, Klein-Goldberger model and
Brookings model; Except for the Brookings
model, interest rates are constant
G shock, at first
quarter: 1.40-2.00; at
two years, 1.90-2.60;
T shock, at first
quarter: 0.80-1.10; at
two years, 1.20-1.60;
Dalsgaard et al.
(2001)
U.S. economy Based on the OECD INTERLINK model;
Constant interest rates
G shock, at one year:
1.10; cumulative at
two years, 2.10
Euro area G shock, at one year:
1.20; cumulative at
two years, 2.10
Coenen et al.
(2010)
U.S. economy Based on the FRB-US model; Different
assumptions about monetary policy
G shock, at one
quarter: 0.85-1.00; at
two years, 0.90-1.20
U.S. economy Different assumptions about monetary policy shock in labor income
tax, at one quarter:
0.30; at two years,
0.30-0.45
Notes: G and T shocks in the fourth column refer to the type of fiscal policy measures analyzed: G = government spending,
T = cut in taxation.
spending multiplier is given by 1/(1 −MPC), while the tax-cut multiplier is given by
MPC/(1−MPC). With an active central bank and in an open economy set-up the the
channels through which fiscal policy affects economic activity increase, however, the size of
the multiplier stays intimately related to the marginal propensity to consume. Generally,
with higher MPC estimated from the equation for aggregate consumption, the models
predict higher spending and tax multipliers.
6.2 Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models
Partly as a response to the Lucas critique, economists in the 1980s and 1990s lost con-
fidence in the traditional macroeconometric models and started exploring other avenues
for analyses. The three other types of macro models, which I now discuss in turn, have
been the main instruments for analysis in the current macroeconomic toolkit.
One approach—the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model—aims to
describe the behavior of the economy as a whole by analyzing the interaction of many
individual decision-makers and the choices the agents make when evaluating the conse-
quences of their own actions, and of the others, in the future. The dependence of current
choices on future uncertain outcomes assigns a central role to agents’ expectations in the
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determination of current macroeconomic results. Because the DSGE models specify a
full economic environment, they can be used to analyze the effects of well-defined pol-
icy experiments on the economy separately from other fundamental disturbances. This
stands in contrast to the identification of the effects of policy actions in the empirical data
where the policy disturbances take place simultaneously with other shocks. To specify
the economic environment, however, the DSGE approach builds on modeling assumptions
whose validity is difficult to quantify empirically. The usual culprits include rationality of
agents, the structure of markets, stickiness of wages and prices, the presence and severity
of financing constraints, and so on.19
In fact, many of the tensions between the proponents and the opponents of the discre-
tionary fiscal stimulus are centered around the assumptions the DSGE modeler chooses to
emphasize. Conditional on initial assumptions, the importance of the channels through
which government policies affects prices and quantities may vary substantially, and in
turn, can lead to diametrically different predictions of the impact of policy actions on
economic activity. For example, forward looking behaviour is a crucial assumption of any
model examining the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy. In the absence of micro-
founded forward looking agents, expected future policy changes have no effects on current
period decisions. On the contrary, forward looking consumers do react in the current
period to expected changes in future variables. Below, I review the theoretical predic-
tions of the two dominant models with a micro-founded forward looking behaviour—the
neoclassical and New Keynesian models.20
In neoclassical models—featuring flexible prices and perfect competition in all markets—
the key channels through which fiscal policy affects the private economy are intra- and
inter-temporal substitution effects, as well as a wealth effect and supply-side tax distor-
19Caballero (2010) provides a thought-provoking, general critique of the DSGE models.
20For completeness, here I sketch the extreme predictions of some models without microfounded forward
looking behaviour. In a model with fully flexible prices and a vertical supply curve, fiscal policy plays no
role in the economy. In the other extreme in the Keynesian model with constant prices, associated with
the IS-LM and Mundell-Fleming analyses, current consumption depends intricately on current disposable
income, not on expected future income. In a closed economy, an expansionary fiscal policy raises output
for any given level of the interest rate and shifts the IS curve—the mapping between output and the
interest rate which characterise equilibrium in the goods market—to the right. With an upward sloping
LM curve—the mapping between output and the interest rate which characterise equilibrium in the
money market—the economy settles at a new short-run equilibrium characterised by a higher interest
rate and a higher level of income. In an open economy, the channels through which fiscal policy boosts
economic activity depends on degree of openness of the economy and the embraced exchange rate regime.
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tions (e.g. Barro and King, 1984; Baxter and King, 1993; Aiyagari et al., 1992; Ludvigson,
1996; and Burnside et al., 2004). To highlight the different effects, I consider shortly the
seminal contribution in Baxter and King (1993) in which the authors conduct an array
of fiscal policy experiments in a prototype neoclassical model. A specific reason to stress
on this model is the clarity of exposition of the different effects. In Table 3, I summa-
rize evidence on the effect of fiscal policy of some frequently cited studies using dynamic
general equilibrium models.21 In the model economy in Baxter and King (1993) with
lump-sum taxes, Ricardian equivalence holds, thus private decision-makers are indifferent
to whether the government finances its spending by current taxes or by borrowing. A
four year increase in government spending, financed by an increase in lump-sum taxa-
tion with the same present discounted value, raises output on impact by a small amount:
the multiplier varies between 0.17 and 0.76, depending on the elasticity of labor supply.
Consumption, however, falls unambiguously. The fall in consumption occurs for two rea-
sons. First, agents anticipate rationally that the discounted value of their future taxes
will rise for the given pattern of future government spending. Under the assumption that
both consumption and leisure are normal goods, the negative wealth effect induces the
consumers to reduce both their private consumption and leisure. With the increase of
labor supply, output expands while the real wage falls along a given labor demand. The
second effect works through intertemporal substitution of future for present consumption.
As interest rates rise on impact, due to the decrease of resources for private uses caused
by government demand, households postpone their consumption spending. With the in-
crease of employment the marginal product of capital rises: a predetermined capital stock
is cooperating with more units of labor. Depending on value of the labor supply elasticity,
private investment might rise or fall: for some values, the positive effect of higher labor
supply on the marginal product of capital becomes large enough to induce the household
to reduce consumption even more. With a strong increase in saving, private investment
may increase.
The interplay between the two effects, i.e. wealth and intertemporal substitution of
consumption, and their overall impact depends crucially on the persistence over time of the
21The sample of examples is in no way complete. Here, I have tried to collect evidence mainly from
estimated, and not calibrated, large-scale DSGE models. The models are estimated mainly with U.S.
data.
19
Table 3: Studies with dynamic general equilibrium models
Study Sample; Country Assumptions/Identification Implied spending
multiplier
Baxter and
King (1993)
Calibrated to U.S.
data
RBC simulations with various
elasticities of labor supply;
temporary fiscal spending,
lump-sum taxes
After G shock, output multiplier
at one quarter: 0.17-0.76;
Negative consumption and
investment response
Persistent fiscal spending,
lump-sum taxes
Output multiplier after G shock,
at one quarter: 0.27-1.03
Temporary fiscal spending
financed through distortionary
taxes
Output multiplier after G shock,
at one quarter: -0.50; at two
years: -0.52;
Christiano
et al. (2011)
Quarterly:
1982:Q1-2008:Q3;
U.S. data
New Keynesian model based on
Altig et al. (2011); ZLB constraint
on interest rate of two or three
years
Output multiplier after G shock
with different persistence, at one
quarter: 1.06-2.20; at two years:
1.10-2.30
Taylor rule and no ZLB constraint Output multiplier after G shock
with different persistence, at one
quarter: 0.95; at two years: 0.7
Coenen et al.
(2010)
Quarterly;
Estimated with
U.S. data and
Euro area data
New Keynesian models of six
different institutions; ZLB
constraint on interest rate of two
years
Output multiplier after G shock,
at one quarter: 0.95-2.00; at two
years: 1.00-1.50
No monetary accommodation Output multiplier after G shock,
at one quarter: 0.80-1.20; at two
years: 0.80-1.30
Monetary accomodation of up to
two years
Output multiplier after
GTR shock, at one quarter:
0.00-0.60; at two years: 0.00-0.70
Monetary accomodation of up to
two years
Output multiplier after
TTR shock, at one quarter:
0.10-2.00; at two years: 0.10-2.40
Monetary accomodation of up to
two years
Output multiplier after
LIT shock, at one quarter:
0.00-1.00; at two years: 0.10-0.50
Monetary accomodation of up to
two years
Output multiplier after
CT shock, at one quarter:
0.20-1.50; at two years: 0.20-0.70
Monetary accomodation of up to
two years
Output multiplier after
CIT shock, at one quarter:
0.10-0.20; at two years: 0.07-0.45
Cogan et al.
(2010)
Quarterly:
1966:Q1-2004:Q4:
U.S. data
New Keynesian model based on
Smets and Wouters (2007). ZLB
constraint on interest rate of one
or two years
Output multiplier after G shock
with high persistence, at one
quarter: 0.96-1.03; at two years:
0.48-0.61
Davig and
Leeper (2011)
Calibrated to U.S.
data
New Keynesian model with
varying activity of monetary/fiscal
regimes
Output multiplier after G shock,
cumulative: 0.80-1.58
Drautzburg and
Uhlig (2011)
Quarterly:
1948:Q2-2008:Q4;
U.S. data
New Keynesian models with
distortionary taxes, transfers,
hand-to-mouth agents. ZLB
constraint on interest rate of two
years
Output multiplier after G shock,
cumulative at two years:
0.30-0.60; cumulative at thirty
years: -0.50-0.00
Notes: ZLB denotes zero lower bound constraint on the nominal interest rate. G, T, GTR, TTR, LIT, CT, CIT shocks
in the fourth column refer to the type of fiscal policy measures analyzed: G = government spending, T = cut in taxation,
GTR = general transfers, TTR = targeted transfers, LIT = cut in labor income tax, CT = cut in consumption tax, CIT
= cut in corporate income tax.
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change in government spending. A permament or a persistent increase in public spending
is associated with a dominant wealth effect of higher future taxes. Because consumption
reacts by more following more persistent shocks—as the consumer is poorer in life-time
terms—and since capital is predetermined on impact of the shock, the labor effort must
also rise by more. The output multiplier is necessarily larger, the more persistent is the
shock.22 For example, in Table 3 a ten year increase in government spending produces an
output multiplier on impact that varies between 0.27 and 1.03. Conversely, a temporary
increase in public spending drives consumption and leisure mainly by intertemporal sub-
stitution. In this case, the reduction of household’s life-time wealth is small relative to
the size of the expansion in government purchases of goods and services.
The predictions of the model can change substantially, however, if the government
finances its consumption by levying distortionary taxes. Now, we have to account for
whether government consumption is deficit-financed (government spending is paid for
by expanding public debt) or tax-financed. Let us consider first—following Baxter and
King (1993)—the case in which taxes increase in parallel to spending so that there is
no change in public debt. The four year increase in government spending produces an
output multiplier on impact of size -0.50. For a more persistent shock, the multiplier can
be much higher. Since high taxes imply temporarily low after-tax factor rewards, there
is a strong incentive to substitute work effort intertemporally away from the spending
increase period and also to reduce investment during this period. Regardless of the value
of the elasticity of labor supply, consumption falls as well. In this example, spending is
contractionary. In contrast, with deficit-financed government spending, the postponement
of the tax burden affects incentives and herewith behaviour in a very diverse manner:
conditional on key substitution and persistence parameters, the distortionary intra- and
inter-temporal substitution effects can generate any pattern of responses of consumption,
labor and the real wage on impact (Ludvigson, 1996; Reis, 2008). That is, it is possible
for labor supply and output to rise in response to the fiscal expansion.
The neoclassical literature has emphasized other conditions under which expansionary
fiscal policy may produce small or even negative government purchases multipliers. For
example, Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), Blanchard (1990), Sutherland (1997) discuss how
22This argument is developed formally in Aiyagari et al. (1992).
21
enlarged public budgets may undercut any effort of the policy-makers to stimulate aggre-
gate demand. That is, expansionary fiscal policy, by persistently increasing public debt,
may trigger an event requiring large fiscal adjustments in the near future. Rational agents
anticipate the likelihood of such an event by cutting their own spending. As a result, the
increase in fiscal spending is more than offset by the decrease in private activity. Overall,
the output multiplier may be negative.
To sum up, neoclassical models predict both negative and positive output multipliers
following a rise in government purchases. In the short run, fiscal shocks affect economic
activity to a large extent by changing labor supply (Ramey, 2011b). As a result, even
if agents have preferences that are non-separable between consumption and leisure,23
a feature that reduces the displacement of consumption following expansionary fiscal
actions, the multiplier cannot be bigger than one. The impact multipliers of tax cuts are
in general smaller than those of government purchases. The cumulative multipliers of tax
cuts at longer horizons, however, especially on labor income, can be much bigger than the
government purchases multiplier, as high as 2.40 as emphasized by Uhlig (2010), mainly
due to the central role of labor supply for the policy transmission in the neoclassical
model.
Fiscal policy affects the economy in the New Keynesian models—incorporating sticky
prices, imperfect competition and possibly other types of imperfections, for example
agency costs and moral hazard issues in capital markets—both through neoclassical and
non-neoclassical channels, with the latter ones being associated with imperfections in fi-
nancial markets that are unrelated to price and wage rigidities.24,25 The proponents of
the New Keynesian idea emphasize that the discussed market imperfections introduce a
role for monetary and fiscal policy in alleviating negative economic disturbances following
which the economy may take to long to adjust without active government policies.
23Linnemann (2006), Bilbiie (2009) and Monacelli and Perotti (2008) analyze the importance of non-
separability between consumption and leisure for the positive response of consumption following govern-
ment purchases shocks. The substitutability between the two goods implies that consumption needs to
increase with the fall in leisure caused by the rise in government demand.
24In Volume 3A of the Handbook of Monetary Economics, Boivin et al. (2010) review the importance
of the neoclassical and non-neoclassical channels for the transmission mechanism of the monetary policy
which are equally relevent for transmission of fiscal policy.
25Studies on fiscal policy in New Keynesian models include Rotemberg and Woodford (1992), Devereux
et al. (1996), Linnemann and Schabert (2003), Ravn et al. (2006), Galí et al. (2007), Hall (2009), and
Woodford (2011), among others.
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Since the New Keynesian paradigm builds upon the neoclassical framework, however,
often the neoclassical channels may tame greatly the positive effects of fiscal policy on
private activity. Upon inspecting the variability of output multipliers following govern-
ment consumption shocks in a variety of DSGE models, Hall (2009) argues that two main
features may guarantee output multipliers of size about one. These two features that
need to work simultaneously, Robert Hall concludes, are countercyclical price mark-ups—
stemming from imperfect competition and rigidity in prices and wages—and elastic labor
supply that needs not be related to the wage elasticity of labor in Walrasian market, as
in many neoclassical models.26 That is, the former feature which is absent in neoclassical
models, on balance, may raise the size of multiplier towards one. The countercyclical
mark-ups cause labor demand to shift rightward following the rise in government con-
sumption: employment is demand-determined. Depending on the relative stickiness of
prices and wages, real wages need not fall as much as in the neoclassical model, and may
even rise. As a result, aggregate employment rises by more. Price rigidities alone, how-
ever, are not a sufficient condition for the wealth and intertemporal substitution effects
to be offset so that following, for example, a rise in fiscal purchases private spending is
crowded-in.27
As stressed above, the efficacy of fiscal policy may vary conditional on the relative
importance of the non-neoclassical channels in the transmission of government’s actions.
A fiscal stimulus program may likely boost private spending, for example, if a large ratio
of households and firms in the economy are liquidity-constrained. In general, liquidity-
constrained agents have a smaller leeway to freely adjust their spending as a consequence
of external disturbances. That is, their spending may likely be highly dependent on
current disposable income and profits (the relative importance of non-neoclassical fac-
tors increases) and less dependent on their life-time income (the relative importance of
neoclassical factors decreases). As a result, expansionary fiscal policy that presumably
increases current income—in times when the ratio of the financially distressed households
and firms is high—may increase overall spending, and as a consequence the multiplier.
26Hall (2009) models the labor market following the search and matching literature.
27Several studies offer a variety of mechanism that may induce crowding-in of consumption following
government expansions, unrelated to price rigidities. Among them: increasing returns to scale in the
production function (Devereux et al., 1996), private utility from government spending (Bouakez and
Rebei, 2007), and as already discussed, complementarity in the period-utility between consumption and
leisure (Bilbiie, 2009; Monacelli and Perotti, 2008).
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In Galí et al. (2007), the authors show that in a New Keynesian model a very high and
constant proportion of liquidity-constrained consumers may contribute to an output mul-
tiplier following government purchases of size about two. Similarly, with the financial
accelerator mechanism from Bernanke et al. (1999), Fernández-Villaverde (2010) demon-
strates that fiscal policy is more effective in boosting aggregate demand when firms are
credit-constrained. The multiplier in the latter study is about one, bigger compared to
the multiplier from the same model framework but without credit-constrained firms, since
government actions exert a positive effect on the firms’ ability to borrow. As a result,
crowding-out of private investment is reduced.
New Keynesian models emphasize an additional element central for the efficacy of fiscal
policy. Namely, the central bank reacts endogenously to developments in the economy
and the embraced monetary policy regime can alter greatly the predictions of the model
about the effects of fiscal policy. In small analytically tractable models, Woodford (2011)
stresses that if monetary policy could, and names a number of cases when it would be
inclined to,28 target an unchanged path of the real interest rate, fiscal policy may fully
determine output. In this vein, Davig and Leeper (2011) provide evidence in support of
an accomodative monetary policy in the United States. The authors estimate Markov-
switching nominal interest rate and tax policy rules to detect active and passive periods
in the behaviour of monetary and fiscal policy for the United States. In Table 3, I report
the estimates for the government purchases multiplier from Davig and Leeper (2011), in
which the authors simulate a standard DSGE by imposing the estimated joint Markov-
switching processes. Dependent on whether fiscal policy is active or passive, and on the
interaction between fiscal and monetary policy, the multiplier may be as low as 0.80 and
as high as 1.58.
Several recent papers, starting with Krugman (1998) and followed by contributions by
Eggertsson and Woodford (2006), Eggertsson (2010), Christiano et al. (2011), Erceg and
Linde (2010), have argued that when the nominal interest rates is constrained around the
zero, in periods of severe recessions, government purchases can be highly effective. The
point is that under such circumstances—when the central bank would effectively want to
set a negative nominal interest rate but cannot (Rudebusch, 2009)—monetary policy is
28An example is a period when firms have high excess capacity which implies that inflation may be less
sensitive to increases in aggregate demand.
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no longer active. Then, a persistent deflationary spiral can set in and further reinforce
the fall in output. Activist fiscal policy, however, can break the spiral by boosting output
and expected inflation: the predicted size of the purchase multiplier is above one and can
be even four.
In Table 3, I report the government purchases multiplier from Christiano et al. (2011).
Using the estimated model for the United States from Altig et al. (2011), the authors
examine the effects of fiscal policy under a number of assumptions about the nature of
monetary policy and persistence of the stimulus program. A common important result is
that with the increase of the duration of the zero lower bound constraint on the nominal
interest rate the size of the multiplier increases. When the constraint binds for two years
the multiplier rises to 2.30. An additional and not less important prediction is that if the
the bulk of the stimulus program takes place when monetary policy is accomodative, the
multiplier is necessary higher. The last point is crucial if implementing a stimulus package
takes to long. For example, in Cogan et al. (2010) the size of the impact multiplier at two
years is smaller than 0.61 even after the auhors consider the consequences of the binding
zero lower bound constraint with a two-year duration. The point is that in this study
the persistence of the fiscal shock is very high. Therefore, the bulk of the fiscal spending
comes at times when the central bank is not passive and follows a Taylor rule. As a
result, the efficacy of government purchases is greatly reduced. Similarly, Drautzburg
and Uhlig (2011) discuss other reasons that may mute the positive effect of fiscal policy
with a passive central bank. The study shows that the cumulated long-run multiplier of
government spending may turn negative if the government levies labor taxes to pay for
the expenditure increase.
An interesting result about the effects of taxation in a zero lower bound period is
discussed in Eggertsson (2012) in realm of a stylized New Keynesian model. The author
argues that under an accomodative monetary policy a temporary rise in payroll tax rates,
by increasing wages and inflation expactions, may play a positive role on output, despite
the distortionary effect of this instrument on aggregate supply. The significance of this
finding is discussed further in Coenen et al. (2010) in a diverse variety of more realistic
set-ups. The results are again reported in Table 3. The latter study employs estimated
models for Canada, the Euro area and the United States to investigate the effects of
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several fiscal instruments. The consensus predictions of all these models is that all types
of discretionary fiscal expansions may boost output in the medium-run except for labor
tax cuts. The latter fiscal initiative has only a minimal effect on economic activity. An
additional finding of the study is that targeted transfers to liquidity-constrained agents,
in contrast to broad-base transfers, is more beneficial in terms of stimulating output.
Taken together, the results from both the neoclassical and the New Keynesian models
offer very diverse predictions on the efficacy of fiscal policy. The predictions are very
sensitive to assumptions about the embraced monetary policy regime, type and duration
of the stimulus fiscal intervention, the degree of price and wage rigidities, and the degree
of non-neoclassical features. Nevertheless, it may be safe to conclude that under certain
conditions a well-composed fiscal stimulus program may be very effective. That is, in times
of a deep recession, when many households and firms are liquidity-constrained, an increase
in government purchases or in targeted transfers to liquidity-constrained households may
stimulate economic activity, especially if the stimulus is temporary and coinciding with
an accomodative monetary policy regime.
6.3 Vector auto-regressions
The fade in popularity of the large-scale macroeconometric models in the mid-seventies,
caused by the prediction failures of their policy advice around the same time, was deter-
mined to no smaller degree because of the great promise of the new econometric framework
advocated by Sims (1980). Christopher Sims suggested that vector auto-regressions—a
linear system of n-variables in which each variable is affected by its past realizations as
well as by the current and past realization of the rest of the system variables—were able
to describe and forecast the dynamics in the data adequately well. The issue with the
VARs is that they cannot identify the channels through which an exogenous event, for
example an unanticipated rise in government purchases, affects other variables in the
specified system. Sims argued, however, that the framework can be used for policy anal-
ysis as well. Structural vector auto-regressions (SVARs), by imposing a minimum set of
restrictions, can separate the actual effect of, say, the policy change from the endogenous
policy reaction to developments in the economy.
The minimum amount of structure in the SVARs is simultaneously both their strength
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and their weakness. That is, less structure implies that the models are less susceptible
to misspecification. On the other hand, the estimate in a SVAR is only an average of
an effect relevant for a particular period, under the particular historical conditions and
accompanying policies at work. This sidenote is especially important in view of the recent
recession when monetary policy’s behaviour in many countries differed from the Taylor
rule convention. The immediate implication is that the policy advice stemming from an
analyses of an effect of fiscal policy with a VAR in the past is not easily transferable to
the current period if important determinants of the policy effect change.
In Table 4, I collect empirical evidence on the efficacy of fiscal policy from some fre-
quently cited papers in the VAR literature using data for the United States and other
OECD countries. Below, I discuss the evidence. Prior to the advent of the VARs, studies
on the economywide effects of fiscal policy on economic activity gauged most generally
the comovement over time between government purchases or taxes, on one hand, and
important economic variables at the national level, on the other hand. Starting with the
seminal paper of Blanchard and Perotti (2002), researchers have employed increasingly
SVARs to uncover the causal relationship between fiscal policy and other economic ag-
gregates. To do that, Blanchard and Perotti imposed restrictions on the VARs suggested
by institutional features specific to fiscal policy. They argued that it is safe to assume
that government purchases react to economic shocks with a delay, while within the pe-
riod taxation responds to economic developments, unrelated to government purchases,
only as prescribed by automatic rules. These assumptions were crucial to identifying the
unanticipated changes in fiscal policy—movements that could not have been related to
the way government has reacted to economic news in the past. Blanchard and Perotti
were able to gauge that a 1 percent rise in government spending (public consumption
and investment) increases GDP by about 1 percent. Symmetrically, a cut in net taxes
by 1 percent boosts GDP by about 1 pecent as well. Beetsma and Giuliodori (2011)
obtain a government purchases multiplier of similar size for fourteen Euro area countries
in a panel VAR framework with a recursive identification (government spending is not
affected contemporaneously by economic activity).
The response of consumption and real wage from SVARs with a la Blanchard and
Perotti (2002) restrictions is frequently emphasized as evidence in support of the relevance
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Table 4: Studies with vector auto-regressions and narrative evidence
Study Sample; Country Assumptions/Identification Implied output
multiplier
Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko
(2012)
Bi-annually:
1960-2010; OECD
data
Regime-switching VARs using
direct projections, augmented with
forecasts
Cumulated G shock, at three
years, in recession: 2.30; in
expansion: ≈ -1.00
Barro (1981),
Hall (2009),
Barro and
Redlick (2011)
Annually, various
samples: some
starting from
1889; U.S. data
Military spending is an instrument
for temporary government
consumption
G shock: 0.6-0.99
Beetsma and
Giuliodori
(2011)
Annually:
1970-2004; 14 EU
countries
Panel VARs with recursive
identification
G shock, at one year: 1.20; at
two years: 1.50
Blanchard and
Perotti (2002)
Quarterly:
1960:Q1-1997:Q4;
U.S. data
SVARs, different assumptions
about trend
G shock, different frequency:
0.84-1.29; T shock, different
frequency: 0.70-1.33; Positive
consumption response
Gordon and
Krenn (2010)
Quarterly:
1939:Q1-1941:Q4;
U.S. data
VARs G shock, at impact if slack: 1.80;
at impact if no slack: 0.88
Mountford and
Uhlig (2009)
Quarterly:
1955:Q1-2000:Q4;
U.S. data
VARs with sign restrictions Cumulated, deficit-spending, at
impact: 0.65; after two years:
-0.26; Cumulated, deficit-financed
tax cut, at impact: 0.29; after
two years: 5.25
Ramey and
Shapiro (1998),
Edelberg et al.
(1999),
Burnside et al.
(2004)
Quarterly, various
samples: starting
from 1947; U.S.
data
Distributed lag and VAR models;
"Ramey-Shapiro" dummies
identify exogenous military
buildups
G shock, different frequency:
0.10-1.20; Nil or negative
consumption response
Leigh et al.
(2011)
Annually,
1978-2011; 17
OECD countries
Distributed lag estimation; Fiscal
consolidations as narrative
evidence to policy changes
Consolidation shock, at two and
three years: between -0.50 and
-0.65
Ramey (2011a) Quarterly, various
samples: starting
from 1939; U.S.
data
VARs; Expected present-value
military buildups as narrative
evidence to government
consumption changes
G shock, different frequency:
0.60-1.20
Romer and
Romer (2010)
Quarterly,
1947:Q1-2007:Q4;
U.S. data
Distributed lag and VAR models;
Legislated tax changes as narrative
evidence
T shock, different frequency:
1.00-3.00;
Notes: G and T shocks in the fourth column refer to the type of fiscal policy measures analyzed (G = government spending
rise, T = taxation cut).
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of the transmission mechanism in the New Keynesian model. Impulse responses from
such models show that government spending shocks boost consumption and real wage.
Similarly, as discussed above, the New Keynesian models, with its price and wage rigidities
as well as with other non-neoclassical features, predict more often than not that a rise in
government consumption leads to a rise in private consumption and real wages.
To identify the exogenous fiscal shocks the VAR literature has exploited other restric-
tions than the one related to the institutional features of fiscal policy. Mountford and Uhlig
(2009), and other researchers after them, have done this by imposing sign-restrictions on
the impulse responses of the VAR model. One main empirical finding of this literature
suggests that the effects of government spending on GDP are small and can be even neg-
ative. This stands in contrast to the effects of tax changes. Mountford and Uhlig (2009)
report that the cumulated multiplier at three years of a deficit-financed spending increase
is negative 0.26 while the cumulated multiplier at three years of a deficit-financed tax cut
is 5.25. The result has strong implication for the composition of fiscal stimulus packages.
Hall (2009) and Barro and Redlick (2011) propose another way of identifying discre-
tionary fiscal changes. They have argued that to estimate the effect of fiscal policy on
economic activity one should exploit the fact that changes in military spending—a com-
ponent of the government purchases—are exogenous to economic activity: i.e. defense
spending decisions are unrelated to developments in the economy, being mainly geopo-
litical. Thus, by measuring the effect of defense purchases on output one is less likely
to obtain inconsistent estimates: the military changes are orthogonal to unobservable
components left in the residual of the econometric specification. The only problem with
this type of analysis is that war periods are accompanied to a large degree by command-
type interventions, for example rationing, and probably tax increases, that makes it hard
to unravel the true size of the private response (negative correlation between the policy
changes and the estimated statistical disturbance due to the omitted factors influencing
the private sector). Hence, the estimate of the private response in this type of experiment
is most probably biased downwards (see, e.g., Hall, 2009).
Several recent papers emphasize the dependence of the multiplier on the state of the
economy. Using a regime-switching model which represents a weighted linear combination
of two distinct VARs, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) demonstrate that the cumu-
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lated government purchases multiplier can be very different in recessions that in expansion
for a number of OECD countries. The authors find that a 1 percent rise in government
spending increases GDP by about 2.3 percent in recessions at three years and decreases it
by 1.0 percent in expansions. Analogously, using a VAR Gordon and Krenn (2010) show
that the spending multiplier was 1.8 in the United States shortly before the World War
II when the economy was plagued by under-utilized resources.
The estimates in the SVAR literature appear to be highly sensitive to the identification
assumptions used, the choice of countries, government spending definitions, time sample,
the variables in the estimation, and their lag length (see, e.g., Perotti, 2005; Caldara and
Kamps, 2008; Canova and Pappa, 2011; and Ramey, 2011b). To avoid imposing strong
assumptions, researchers have come up with new ideas on how to estimate the impact of
fiscal policy. Recently, Romer and Romer (2010) and Ramey (2011a) have demonstrated
how to estimate models that incorporate evidence from contemporary forecasts, news in
the media, and the narrative government record on policy actions for unexpected reasons.
For example, Romer and Romer (2010) have collected information on tax changes based on
the narrative government record accompanying legislated U.S. tax bills, and demonstrated
that these changes have an output multiplier of size 3. Ramey (2011a) has collected
information about the expected discounted value of changes in government purchases
due to U.S. foreign military interventions. The created variable is intended to measure
expectations of the future government spending. Ramey finds that exogenous changes in
defense spending lead to an increase in output, consistent with the previous literature, but
all main components of private consumption fall, except for services consumption. The
latest evidence, the fall of consumption and real wage following an increase in government
purchases has frequently been emphasized as evidence in support of the relevance of the
transmission mechanism in the neoclassical model.
7 Conclusion
This paper surveys multiplier estimates from the Euro area and the United States on
common types of fiscal policy changes: mainly, broad-based tax cuts and unproductive
spending increases. The notion of using the multiplier as a metric for the efficacy of
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activist policies is related to its predictive power about how fast the economy may grow
following fiscal stimulus actions: the larger is the multiplier, the more stimulative is
the discretionary measure. The paper elaborates on the different methods—direct and
indirect—and the estimates obtained by them with the hope of narrowing down the size
of the effects of the various fiscal instruments. A parallel goal of the study has been
detecting recurring factors among the surveyed studies that are important determinants
for the policy efficacy.
Despite the enourmous recent effort to find the consensus multiplier values, and the in-
crease of fiscal activism in the last decade—generating additional empirical observations—
the quest for the multiplier has been as elusive as before. That is, fiscal policy is multi-
faceted, using many different instruments, and its effects are confounded with the reac-
tions and influence of other factors. Thus, the hardest obstacle in view of measuring the
aggregate multiplier is lack of macroeconomic data (see, e.g., Parker et al. (2011)).
Despite these difficulties, progress has been made. Several recent macro studies have
found that fiscal policy can be substantially more effective in recessions. For example, they
report that the conditional effect of an unanticipated rise in government purchases in a
recession may likely be higher than 1.5. Indirect estimates of the multiplier, obtained from
household studies such as Parker et al. (2011), can shed light on the issue. The measured
cumulative MPC above 50% is difficult to reconcile with the permanent income hypothesis,
and suggests that binding of liquidity constraints on households in recessions foreshadow
large conditional aggregate effects of fiscal policy. Nevertheless, our understanding of the
state dependent effects of fiscal policy is still incomplete.
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